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AN EXAMINATION  OF 
INTERNATIONAL  TRADE DATA IN THE 1980s 
Introduction 
During  the  198Os,  the  United  States  has  experi- 
enced  tremendous  volatility  in its exchange  rate  and 
has  seen  its  current  account  balance  move  from  a 
surplus  to  a large  deficit  position.  These  vicissitudes 
in turn  have  provoked  much  speculation  about  their 
probable  causes.  In this  article  I examine  three  com- 
peting  hypotheses  and  their  ability  to explain  events 
in international  trade  and financial markets.  The  alter- 
native  hypotheses  view  the  trade  figures  as outcomes 
caused  by  either  (I)  large  U.S.  budget  deficits,  (2) 
tight  U.S.  monetary  policy,  or  (3) real  shocks  to in- 
vestment  caused  by  changes  in the  U.S.  tax  code. 
Although  the  hypotheses  are not  mutually  exclusive, 
one  may  usefully  examine  them  in isolation.  In this 
regard  the  analysis  is  similar  in  spirit  to  Blanchard 
and  Summers  (1984)  who  analyzed  the  rise  in real 
interest  rates  worldwide.  While  no  entirely  con- 
sistent  explanation  emerges,  the  real-shock 
hypothesis  seems  to  match  the  data  best.  The 
hypothesis  that  large  U.S.  budget  deficits  caused  the 
current  trade  deficit  and  the  large  appreciation  and 
subsequent  depreciation  of  the  dollar  receives  the 
weakest  support.  A  tightening  of  U.S.  monetary 
policy,  while  consistent  with  events  in  the  early 
198Os,  is not  overly  persuasive  either. 
Characterization  of  the  Data 
Before  attempting  to  isolate  theoretically  the 
major  factors  involved  in the  recent  movements  of 
the  trade  data,  one  must  characterize  those  figures 
as well  as others  closely  related  to  them,  including 
interest  rates,  returns  on  equities,  and  real  output 
growth. 
One  important  feature  of  the  data  is that  almost 
all of the  movements  in the  trade-weighted  nominal 
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exchange  are  real’  (see  chart).  The  real  nature 
of exchange  rate  movements  is confirmed  in Table 
I on  a country-by-country  basis.  Another  important 
feature  is that  both  nominal  and  real  interest  rates2 
have  fallen  over  the  period  in the  United  States  and 
its major  trading  partners  (see  Table  II).  Inflation  is 
also  seen  to  be  declining  worldwide. 
Stock  market  performance  is observed  to be highly 
correlated  across  the  various  stock  exchanges  (Table 
III).  Most  countries’  stock  markets,  the  exception 
being  Japan,  experienced  declines  in value  in  1981 
and  1982.  Other  than  1984,  the  rest  of the  sample 
r  The  real exchange  rate  is the  nominal  exchange  rate  adjusted 
for  different  price  level  movements  in  various  countries  and, 
therefore,  measures  the  amount  of  foreign  Eoods  that  are 
needed  to  buy  U.S.  goods.  Formally,  the  realexchange  rate, 
E  =  efP/P’).  where  e is the  nominal  exchanee  rate  (i.e..  units 
of  fore&n  &rency  per  dollar),  P  is  the  U.Sy  price  ievei,  and 
P’  is  the  foreign  price  level. 
*  The  real  interest  rate  is the  nominal  interest  rate  adjusted  for 
inflation  and  represents  the  number  of  goods  that  must  be 
sacrificed  next  year  in order  to consume  one  more  unit  of goods 
today.  That  is,  the  real  rate  is approximately  the  nominal  rate 
minus  the  rate  of  inflation. 
NOMINAL  AND  REAL 
TRADE-WEIGHTED  EXCHANGE  RATES 
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Source:  Board  of  Governors  of  the  Federal  Reserve  System. 
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Nominal  Exchange  Rate 
Trade-  United 









87.385  2.326  1.818  226.528 
103.261  2.028  2.261  220.451 
116.498  1.751  2.428  249.051 
125.325  1.517  2.555  237.446 
138.343  1.336  2.848  237.588 
143.235  1.296  2.944  238.47.2 
112.270  1.467  2.171  168.498 
96.947  1.639  1.798  144.631 

















31.125  2.326  1.818  226.528 
37.001  2.063  2.400  232.314 
40.765  1.801  2.693  267.645 
43.020  1.581  2.920  256.653 
47.229  1.398  3.340  261.559 
48.535  1.385  3.526  266.298 
37.999  1.594  2.603  186.114 
33.305  1.795  2.238  162.138 

















75.010  132.893  74.869  90.956 
88.638  115.847  93.100  88.516 
100.000  100.000  100.000  100.000 
107.577  86.661  105.206  95.340 
118.751  76.338  117.304  95.397 
122.951  74.053  121.257  95.752 
96.371  83.805  89.414  67.656 
83.217  93.625  74.034  58.073 









1980  76.354  129.194  67.505  84.638  97/.789 
1981  90.767  114.590  89.112  86.799  99.196 
1982  100.000  100.000  100.000  100.000  100.000 
1983  105.533  87.808  108.425  95.893  98.762 
1984  115.858  77.643  124.019  97.726  104.538 
1985  119.062  76.920  130.936  99.497  110.699 
1986  93.216  88.510  96.648  69.538  112.094 
1987  81.700  99.692  83.087  60.580  106.481 
period  showed  rather  strong  performance.  The  fourth 
quarter  of  1987  shows  the  worldwide  scope  of  the 
October  crash. 
Regarding  current  account  balances,  only  the 
United  States  has  consistently  run  a deficit  (Table 
V). This  fact  suggests  anomalous  behavior  of some 
important  policy  or exogenous  variable  in the  United 
States.  One  also  observes  that  after 
1982  real  output  growth  has  been 
fairly strong  for all countries  (Table  V). 
The  relevant  variables  central  to the 
three  hypotheses,  namely  budget 
deficits,  money  growth,  and  the  effec- 
tive  tax  rate  on  capital  in  the  United 
States  are  discussed  next.  In  examin- 
ing  budget  deficits,  I  emphasize  the 
behavior  of the  more  meaningful  con- 
cept  of  real  budget  deficit  (see  Barro 
11984)  and  Eisner  [1989]),  although 
data  on  nominal  deficits  are  also 
displayed  (Tables  Via  and  VIb).  The 
real  deficit  is  calculated  as  in  Barro 
(1984)  and measures  the  change  in the 
real  value  of  outstanding  liabilities 
owed  by the  government.3  Transform- 
ing  the  national  accounts  data  in  this 
way  helps  to  overcome  some  of  the 
severe  problems  associated  with 
measuring  the  deficit.  Ideally,  one 
would  like  a  measure  of  government 
deficits  based  on  the  kind  of account- 
ing  used  by  a  typical  business.  Such 
business  accounting  treats  capital  ex- 
penditures  differently  from  current 
outlays  and depreciation.  So too  should 
they  be treated  in government  account- 
ing.  Moreover,  appreciation  of  the 
value  of government  assets,  such  as the 
gold  stock  and  publicly  held  land, 
should  be  included.  Also,  changes  in 
the  present  value  of future  obligations 
such  as  social  security  payments  or 
obligations  of the  deposit  insurance  cor- 
porations  in the  United  States  should 
be  taken  into  account.  None  of these 
items  seem  to be adequately  accounted 
for  in  current  measures  of the  deficit. 
Furthermore,  the  deficits  of  local 
governments  are  omitted. 
Serious  measurement  problems  also 
affect  the  data  on  the  current  account 
of  the  balance  of  payments.  For  ex- 
ample,  these  data  do  not  include 
changes  in asset  values  held  by foreign  - 
investors  in each  country.  Eisner  (1989)  indicates  that  I 
I 
3  Specifically  the  real  budget  deficit 
b  _  Bt+Ht  Bt-l+Ht-1 
t--K--  Pt-1 
where  B is the  nominal  value  of government  bonds  held  by the 
public,  H  is high-powered  money,  and  P  is the  GNP  deflator. 
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Inflation  and  Interest  Rates 
United  United 
States  Kingdom  Germany  Japan  Canada 
1981 
Nominal  Interest  Rate 
Inflation  Rate 
Real  interest  Rate 
1982 
Nominal  Interest  Rate 
Inflation  Rate 
Real  Interest  Rate 
1983 
Nominal  Interest  Rate 
Inflation  Rate 
Real  interest  Rate 
1984 
Nominal  Interest  Rate 
Inflation  Rate 
Real  Interest  Rate 
1985 
Nominal  Interest  Rate 
inflation  Rate 
Real  Interest  Rate 
1986 
Nominal  interest  Rate 
Inflation  Rate 
Real  Interest  Rate 
1987 
Nominal  Interest  Rate 
Inflation  Rate 
Real  interest  Rate 
14.08  13.03  10.57  7.43  17.72 
9.63  11.89  4.03  2.69  10.55 
4.45  1.14  6.54  4.74  7.16 
10.72  11.47  8.02  6.94  13.64 
6.43  7.60  4.36  1.87  8.65 
4.29  3.87  3.66  5.07  4.99 
8.62  9.59  5.64  6.39  9.31 
3.86  5.24  3.26  0.78  5.06 
4.76  4.35  2.38  5.61  4.25 
9.57  9.30  5.66  6.10  11.06 
3.87  4.27  1.99  1.25  3.11 
5.70  5.03  3.68  4.85  7.95 
7.48  11.56  4.96  6.46  9.43 
3.68  5.89  2.22  1.52  3.26 
3.80  5.67  2.74  4.94  6.17 
5.97  10.37  3.85  4.79  8.97 
1.96  3.67  3.08  1.86  2.45 
4.01  6.69  0.77  2.93  6.52 
5.82  9.25  3.28 
3.58  4.43  2.06 
2.24  4.82  1.22 
3.51  8.15 
-0.24  4.44 
3.75  3.70 
Note:  Nominal  interest  rate  is  l-year  Treasury  bill  rate,  except  call  money  rate  for  Japan. 
Source:  International  Financial  Statistics,  December  1985  and  February  1989. 
relative  to  output  move  in 
any  strikingly  different  way 
from  the  deficits  of  other 
countries. 
Monetary  data  are  given 
in Table  VII.  As measured 
by  Ml  growth,  the  United 
States  experienced  a fairly 
severe  monetary  tightening 
in  198 1,  as  did  Germany 
and  Canada.  After  that  epi- 
sode  Ml  growth  strength- 
ened.  Looking  at  M2 
growth,  one  is  unable  to 
discern  any  pattern  that 
distinguishes  the  United 
States  from  other  countries. 
The  last  bit  of  data  con- 
cerns  the  effective  marginal 
tax  rate  on  total  nonresi- 
dential  business  plant  and 
equipment.  These  figures 
are  taken  from  Hulten  and 
Robertson  (1982),  who  at- 
tempt  to construct  an index 
number  that  measures  the 
difference  between  the 
before  and  after  tax  return 
on  capital.  Numbers  for 
1983-1986  are  taken  from 
the  Hulten-Robertson 
forecasts  of  effective  tax 
rates  conditional  on various 
rates  of  inflation.  These 
rates  are  .33  (1980),  26 
(1981),  .047  (1982),  .Ol 
(1984-1986).  The  rates  do 
not  include  the  effects  that 
individual  tax rates  have  on 
the  cost  of  capital  and  do 
not  go  beyond  1986  since 
tax laws were  changed  after 
that  date.  While  no 
numbers  are  presented  for 
the  post-1986  period,  the  1986  tax  law is viewed  as 
having  significantly  raised  the  effective  marginal  tax 
rate  on  capital. 
Confronting  the  Hypotheses  with  the  Data 
this oversight  may  be of such  magnitude  that  in reality 
the  United  States  is not  really  a debtor  nation.  Given 
these  measurement  problems,  one  can only  hope  that 
the  overall  movements  in the  data  reported  for both 
the  trade  and  budget  deficits  are  roughly  correlated 
with  magnitudes  that  are  of  more  economic 
relevance.  Having  described  the  relevant  data,  I now  turn  to 
The  reported  data  on  budget  deficits  show  that  the  three  competing  hypotheses.  First  I investigate 
relative  to  output  the  real  U.S.  budget  deficit  is not  the  financial  press’s  most  popular  explanation,  U.S. 
particularly  large.  Nor  does  the  U.S.  budget  deficit  budget  deficits.  But as mentioned  above,  the  real U.S. 
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Real  Stock  Indexes 
United  United 









































82.0  91.1  99.2  95.1  92.7 
90.6  96.9  105.3  96.0  104.9 
93.7  100.4  104.9  98.8  106.5 
100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
96.7  99.2  97.1  108.4  99.5 
92.5  98.3  102.5  123.4  98.4 
79.8  85.5  93.9  113.7  77.1 
82.8  94.6  92.1  117.9  76.4 
75.7  95.8  95.9  107.3  61.1 
73.1  93.8  90.0  107.1  51.2 
79.6  105.0  92.9  105.5  59.1 
91.1  107.7  99.0  120.1  69.4 
99.6  114.8  115.8  123.2  75.6 
106.0  127.7  123.1  128.9  85.3 
105.3  123.4  120.8  136.5  87.9 
102.9  127.7  133.4  143.3  86.8 
97.5  141.6  130.1  165.4  81.2 
92.3  129.7  127.7  153.2  74.7 
98.6  143.0  134.5  159.1  81.2 
100.0  153.6  139.6  174.4  79.9 
107.1  159.9  149.1  191.6  86.0 
112.9  148.4  179.1  193.9  86.6 
106.1  154.4  196.1  188.5  84.2 
122.7  171.3  248.3  196.2  91.0 
138.9  201.7  266.7  242.3  94.2 
143.6  196.9  251.4  251.3  92.9 
131.5  182.7  250.2  305.3  89.7 
138.4  197.3  264.1  310.1  92.5 
161.5  234.5  226.2  376.7  113.4 
169.2  265.9  235.7  403.3  113.1 
174.7  273.9  242.7  414.8  117.3 
133.0  202.1  157.7  333.1  94.1 
Note:  Price  trends  on  the  world’s  major  stock  markets,  as calculated  by Morgan  Stanley 
Capital  Perspective,  Geneva,  and  reported  in  The  Wall  Street  Journal.  Each  index  is 
based  on the  close  of  1980  equaling  100.  Price  trends  are  deflated  by  CPI  in which 
1980:4  equals  1. 
budget  deficit,  relative  to  the  real 
budget  deficits  of other  countries,  is not 
particularly  large.  Nor  does  it  exhibit 
behavior  much  different  from  the 
deficits  of other  countries.  Therefore, 
one  would  not  expect  it  to  affect  the 
terms  of trade  (i.e.,  the  real  exchange 
rate).  To  the  extent  that  budget  deficits 
crowd  out  private  investment,  real  in- 
terest  rates  would  be  expected  to rise. 
If  so,  investment  should  fall  and 
equity  markets  should  perform  poorly. 
The  resulting  lower  investment  over 
time  would  lead to a lower  capital  stock 
and  reduced  output.  These  events, 
however,  did  not  occur.  Instead,  after 
1982  investment  was  strong  and  out- 
put  rose.  In general,  therefore,  the  ex- 
perience  of the  1980s  does  not conform 
to  a  theory  based  on  the  behavior  of 
the  U.S.  budget  deficits. 
Another  possibility  is that  the  data 
have  been  generated  by an unexpected 
monetary  contraction  in  the  United 
States.  Indeed,  such  a contraction  did 
occur  in 198 1. Given  this unanticipated 
monetary  contraction,  one  would  ex- 
pect  output  in the  United  States  to fall 
and  real  interest  rates  to  rise.  Reces- 
sion  would  occur  if  producers  con- 
fused  relative  price  level  movements 
with  movements  in  the  aggregate 
nominal  price  level  causing  a fall in ag- 
gregate  supply.  4  Real  interest  rates 
would  rise  to  equilibrate  the  demand 
for  goods  with  the  lower  output.  As 
misperceptions  were  corrected,  output 
would  rise and real interest  rates  would 
fall.  Contrary  to  this  hypothetical  se- 
quence  of  events,  however,  Table  II 
shows  that  real  rates  remained  high 
through  1984  even  though  output  was 
growing  strongly. 
The  initial  U.S.  monetary  contrac- 
tion  would  also be  associated  with  both 
a real  and  nominal  appreciation  of the 
exchange  rate.  The  real  exchange  rate 
would  appreciate  because  U.S.  goods 
would  become  relatively  scarcer  due 
4  Relative  price  level  movements  refer  to  the 
change  in  a particular  price  or  wage  rate  with 
respect  to  all other  prices,  while  a movement 
in  the  aggregate  price  level  refers  to  an  equi- 
proportional  change  in  all prices. 
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Nominal  Returns  on  Equity  in  Local Currency 
United  United 
States  Kingdom  Germany  Japan  Canada 
1980  32.6  35.4  4.0  9.5  24.0 
1981  -  5.0  13.7  4.9  17.3  -  10.7 
1982  21.6  29.2  19.4  6.0  6.5 
1983  27.6  29.1  44.2  25.2  33.8 
1984  6.2  31.9  11.2  26.4  -  1.4 
1985  31.7  20.4  87.1  15.9  22.9 
1986  18.4  27.3  8.3  51.0  9.4 
1981  -5.0  -9.0  -  10.4  8.3  -  10.0 
1982  21.6  9.3  10.5  -0.8  2.7 
1983  22.6  16.0  24.0  26.7  32.2 
1984  6.2  5.2  -  5.3  16.9  -7.1 
1985  31.7  50.4  138.3  45.3  16.2 
1986  18.4  29.4  34.1  89.2  11.1 
Nominal  Returns  on  Equity  in  U.S.  Dollars 
Source:  lntefnational  Finance  Yearbook.  London:  Midland  Montagu,  1987. 
Table  V 
Current  Account  Balance 
United  United 
States  Kingdom  Germany  Japan  Canada 
1981  6.87  14.50  -3.31  4.77  -5.11 
1982  -8.64  8.04  4.99  6.85  2.23 
1983  -46.29  5.74  5.40  20.80  2.49 
1984  -  107.14  2.54  9.75  35.00  2.00 
1985  -  115.16  4.74  16.98  49.17  -  1.43 
1986  -  138.84  -0.35  39.76  85.33  -7.54 
1987  -  153.95  -4.26  45.43  87.00  -  7.98 
Note:  Current  account  in  U.S.  billions  of  dollars. 
Growth of Real  Output 
1981  2.52  -  1.41  0.00  4.07  3.29 
1982  -2.55  1.12  -0.96  3.10  -3.39 
1983  3.57  3.55  1.90  3.24  3.70 
1984  6.43  2.08  3.28  5.06  6.12 
1985  2.73  3.92  1.94  4.71  4.30 
1986  3.57  2.93  2.32  2.51  2.96 
1987  2.89  3.65  1.76  4.36  4.18 
Note:  Real  growth  in  GNP,  except  GDP  for  United  Kingdom. 
Source:  international  Financial  Statistics,  December  1985  and  February  1989. 
to  the  decline  in  output.  And  the 
nominal  exchange  rate  would  ap- 
preciate  if policy  were  expected  to  re- 
main  tight  implying  that  the  supply  of 
dollars  would  be falling relative  to other 
currencies.  Finally,  equity  prices  should 
fall due  to lower  output  and  higher  real 
interest  rates. 
The  initial  movements  in exchange 
rates,  interest  rates,  and  inflation  are 
consistent  with  an  unanticipated 
tightening  of monetary  policy.  Subse- 
quently,  when  the  effects  of  the 
monetary  tightening  had  worn  off,  and 
the  economy  had recovered,  one would 
expect  real rates  to fall and the  real ex- 
change  rate  to  begin  returning  to  its 
initial  level.  After  all,  restoration  of 
these  real  magnitudes  to  their  natural 
equilibrium  positions  following  a 
monetary  shock  is perfectly  consistent 
with  the  notion  that  money  is neutral 
in its effects  on real variables  in the  long 
run.  One  would  also  expect  the 
nominal  exchange  rate  to  remain  high 
if U.S.  monetary  policy  remained  tight 
and,  therefore,  real  and  nominal  ex- 
change  rate paths  should  diverge.  Since 
these  longer-run  patterns  are  not  evi- 
dent  in  the  data  (see  chart),  it  is 
reasonable  to  conclude  that  the  time 
path  of the  data  was  not  generated  by 
monetary  phenomena-although  the 
initial  movements  in the  data  are  con- 
sistent  with  the  tightening  of monetary 
policy  in  1981. 
One  final  hypothesis  is  based  on 
supply  side  disturbances  due  to  lower 
effective  marginal  tax  rates  on  capital 
in the  United  States.  This  tax cut made 
investment  in  the  United  States 
relatively  more  profitable  and, 
therefore,  attractive.  It  seems 
reasonable  that  individuals  believed 
that  the  tax  cut  would  exhibit  some 
degree  of persistence.  A belief  that  the 
tax  cut  would  not  be  immediately  re- 
scinded  is consistent  with  the  general 
sluggishness  of  tax  rate  changes.  In 
1981,  the  tax  on  physical  capital  was 
lowered  in  the  United  States.  As  a 
result,  the  demand  to  invest  in  the 
United  States  rose  and  real  interest 
rates  rose  to  bring  consumption  plus 
FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  RICHMOND  25 1981  -  72.62  -  12.045  -35.86  -  12.37 
1982  -  125.7  -  9.567  -  32.02  -  13.29 
1983  -  202.5  -  13.372  -  32.95  -  12.47 
1984  -  178.3  -  10.33  -32.29  -  12.08 
1985  -  212.2  -  11.269  -20.26  -  11.32 
1986  -  212.6  -  6.949  -  16.34  -  11.5 
1987  -  156.0  -4.011  -  25.44  N.A. 
1981  -0.024  -  0.047  -0.023  -  0.048 
1982  -  0.040  -  0.034  -  0.020  -  0.049 
1983  -  0.059  -0.044  -0.020  -  0.044 
1984  -  0.047  -0.032  -  0.018  -0.040 
1985  -0.053  -  0.032  -0.011  -  0.036 
1986  -  0.050  -0.018  -0.008  -  0.035 
1987  -0.035  -0.010  -0.013  N.A. 
Table  VI  (A) 
BUDGET  DEFICITS 








of  Pounds) 
Germany 
(Billions 
of  DMarks) 
Japan 
(Trillions 
of  Yen) 
Government  Budget  Deficit(  -)/GNP 
Canada 
(Billions 
of  Canadian 
Dollars) 
-8.43 
-  20.81 
-25.16 
-  28.87 
-  28.68 
-  20.51 
-  17.58 
-0.024 
-0.058 
-  0.064 
-0.067 
-0.062 
-  0.042 
-  0.033 
Sources:  International  Financial  Statistics,  December  1985  and  February  1989. 
Comparative  Statistics  and  Financial  Statistics:  Japan  and  Other  Major  Countries. 
Bank  of  Japan,  1987,  p.  85. 
Table  VI  (B) 
BUDGET  DEFICITS 




of  Dollars) 
Germany 
(Billions 
of  DMarks) 
Japan 
(Trillions 
of  Yen) 
1981  -7.6 
1982  -93.3 
1983  -  120.0 
1984  -  123.1 
1985  -  132.4 
1986  -  147.3 
1987  -  56.6 
-20.5 
-  25.8 
-22.1 
-  20.7 
-  18.4 
-  10.8 
-  26.5 
-9.2 
-  12.4 
-  18.9 
-  10.5 
-  12.6 
-  10.2 
-  12.6 
Canada 
(Billions 
of  Canadian 
Dollars) 
-  1.5 
-  10.2 
-  14.9 
-  17.1 
-  22.8 
-  10.9 
-  10.1 
Real  Government  Deficit(  -)/Real  GNP 
1981  -  0.003  -0.014  -  0.037  -  0.005 
1982  -  0.034  -0.018  -  0.048  -  0.034 
1983  -  0.043  -0.015  -0.071  -  0.048 
1984  -0.041  -0.013  -  0.033  -0.052 
1985  -0.043  -0.012  -0.043  -  0.066 
1986  -  0.046  -0.007  -  0.034  -0.031 
1987  -0.017  -0.016  -0.041  -0.027 
Sources:  lnterrtational  Financial  Stafistics,  December  1985  and 
February  1989.  Bank  for  international  Settlements. 
investment  in line with output.  Because 
investment  in  the  United  States 
became  relatively  attractive,  capital 
gradually  flowed  there.  This  flow  con- 
tinued  until  after-tax  rates  of  return 
were  equilibrated  worldwide.  To  bal- 
ance  the  capital  inflow  the  United 
States  had  to  run  a  balance  of  trade 
deficit.  Also,  because  people  believed 
that  the  tax  cut  would  persist,  there 
were  wealth  effects.  Even  though  the 
whole  world  is made  wealthier  (since 
foreigners  own  assets  in  the  United 
States),  the  favorable  change  in  the 
terms  of trade  plus  the  fact  that  U.S. 
residents  hold  proportionately  more  of 
their  wealth  in the  United  States  meant 
that  the  United  States  became  rela- 
tively  wealthier.  Hence  U.S.  consump- 
tion  demand  rose  relative  to  foreign 
consumption  and  pushed  the  U.S. 
balance  of  trade  further  into  deficit. 
The  tax  cut  also  caused  equity  prices 
to  rise  since  after-tax  earnings 
increased. 
As  the  capital  stock  in  the  United 
States  grows,  more  output  will  be 
produced  and  eventually  supply-side 
effects  will  dominate  causing  a  re- 
versa1 in the  initial exchange-rate  appreciation.  Also, 
the  marginal  after-tax  rate  of  return  on  investment 
and  thus  the  real  interest  rate  will  decline  as  the 
capital  stock  increases.  Further,  since  more  U.S. 
goods  are  being  produced  relative  to  foreign  goods, 
the  real  exchange  rate  should  depreciate  to  a level 
below  its initial  value.  Accompanying  this  deprecia- 
tion  will  be  a  reversal  in  the  balance  of  trade. 
Analogously,  the  1986  increase  in marginal  tax rates 
should  have  just  the  opposite  effect.  That  is,  one 
should  observe  a balance  of payments  surplus,  fall- 
ing  real  rates  of  return,  and  a  real  exchange  rate 
depreciation. 
The  above  explanation  captures  much  of  the 
movements  in the  data,  but  it obviously  suffers  from 
a  few  deficiencies.  The  biggest  deficiency  is  the 
predicted  similarity  in  the  timing  between  real  ex- 
change  rate  depreciation  and  the  movement  of the 
balance  of payments  into  surplus.  Also,  the  mecha- 
nism  described  is not  particularly  successful  at pro- 
ducing  a worldwide  expansion  of  output  unless  the 
global  wealth  effects  are  capable  of  generating  the 
magnitude  of  expansion  we  have  recently  seen. 
Presumably  appeal  to  some  worldwide  advances  in 
technology  would  be  needed  to  solve  this  particular 
piece  of  the  puzzle. 
26  ECONOMIC  REVIEW.  MARCH/APRIL  1989 United 
States 
Table  VII 
MONETARY  DATA 
Ml  Growth 
United 
Kingdom  Germany  Japan  Canada 
1981  2.4*  17.80  -1.56  9.96  -0.32 
1982  9.0*  11.31  7.14  5.75  12.21 
1983  10.3*  11.14  8.38  -0.12  12.45 
1984  5.94  15.42  5.97  6.93  19.97 
1985  12.40  18.12  6.68  3.01  33.20 
1986  16.46  22.11  8.17  10.34  14.85 
1987  2.60  22.82  7.50  4.89  6.05 
*  These  figures  are  for  effective  Ml  and  are taken  from  Broaddus  and  Goodfriend  t19841. 
Note:  Ml  values  are  in  each  country’s  own  currency. 
M2  Growth 
1981  9.91  34.90  5.98  11.14  27.63 
1982  8.93  11.39  6.75  8.51  4.88 
1983  11.92  13.86  4.64  10.32  -  3.93 
1984  8.52  10.58  5.46  6.89  1.02 
1985  8.50  7.00  8.60  11.46  -4.24 
1986  9.08  22.82  5.82  8.86  3.62 
1987  3.55  19.71  5.35  13.75  10.01 
Note:  M2  values  are  in  each  country’s  own  currency.  U.S.  M2  is  national  definition. 
Source:  International  Financial  Statistics,  December  1985  and  February  1989. 
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